Environmental Character: Environmental Feelings, Sentiments and Virtues by Frasz, Geoffrey
Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084-9257). Vol. 7 (2016). No. 1, 
Art. #4, pp. 32-43. doi: 10.14746/eip.2016.1.3
Environmental Character: Environmental 
Feelings, Sentiments and Virtues 
Geoffrey Frasz 
(College of Southern Nevada in Las Vegas, Geoffrey.Frasz@csn.edu) 
1. Introduction: The Incompleteness of EVE
Currently theories and accounts of Environmental Virtue Ethics (EVE) focus on
the character of various environmental figures and giving an account of
various virtues from an environmental consideration. For instance, Ron Sandler
(2007) in his full theoretical account connecting virtue ethics with
environmental ethics argues that an ethic of character can and should be
informed by environmental considerations. Yet applied and theoretical work in
EVE remains incomplete for several reasons. First, there has been little work
connecting moral feelings and moral sentiments to environmental concerns
(see: Partridge 1996; Steverson 2003; Callicott 1990; Colins & Barkdull 1995;
Bowles 2008; for a criticism of using moral sentiments as a basis for
environmental thought, see: Fieser 1993). While much has been done with the
environmental virtues that are associated with these feelings/sentiments, a full
theory of EVE will need to develop what these sentiments are and how they
connect to environmental traits of character making up the bulk of current
work on EVE. Second, a full theory of EVE must provide an account of the
nature of strength of character regarding these virtues. While it is good to feel a
desire to care for nature and a concern that this desire be reflected in the
behaviours that make up one’s character. Yet to make sure this concern is
reflected in action requires an account of how strength of will plays a role in
maintaining environmentally grounded action, even sacrifice. Such an account
will also have to explain the phenomena of weakness of will when attempts are
made to adopt a better, environmentally sensitive set of actions and modify
one’s character to reflect environmental concerns. Furthermore, while
autonomy is often held necessary for doing the right thing, how this self-
legislating stance can be connected to an environmental sense of the
interconnectedness of all things remains still undone. But even if full theory of
EVE provides account of sentiments, moral strength and virtuous dispositions
that together all form a basis for an environmentally informed moral character,
it will remain incomplete.
To be complete EVE it must also provide an account of the wisdom to 
articulate an account of what is an environmentally good life. It is this last point 
I will address in this paper. Without an account of environmentally informed 





Environmental wisdom is needed to give direction and inform decisions along 
the way of living an environmentally good life. Coupled with a full account of 
what kind of person EVE would have us be, there is needed an account of an 
environmentally wise person, someone who has a sophisticated understanding 
of the [natural] world and is adept at living a morally satisfying life informed by 
that understanding. Such a full account of environmental wisdom would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. This paper will focus on the connection 
between environmental sentiments and environmental virtues. I will argue that 
it can be shown how the two are related and an account of a distinctive 
environmental sentiment of a feeling towards natural entities can complement 
the environmental virtue of openness. 
2. Environmental Emotions and Sentiments 
It is commonly held that being able to experience moral emotions is a sign of a 
person able to function morally well. It is further held that a person who can 
experience moral emotions such as guilt or shame, admiration, disgust, 
remorse, regret, outrage, and sympathy has the necessary psychological make 
up that is part of being a morally good person. To lack the ability to frequently 
experience these feelings indicates a person of a poor moral character. Thus 
we claim that a psychopath or sociopath is not morally a good person. When a 
person has developed a moral generalize feeling for the good over time, we hold 
that such a person has developed moral sentiments. These can be understood 
as higher-order feelings, motivational dispositions that incline a person 
towards the good (Rawls 1971, p. 479). We consider people to be morally good 
when they have internalized moral norms and are motivated to act out of a 
sense of what is good, rather than a sense of punishment or reward. There are 
a variety of moral sentiments that people may feel as motivating them: duty, 
honour, caring, nobility, to name some. In the spirit of trying to characterize 
what makes up the moral psychology of an environmentally good person, we 
can ask what might be some distinctive environmental sentiments, emotional 
dispositions that regularly motivate people to engage in environmentally good 
actions. Unfortunately, there has been little work connecting moral feelings and 
moral sentiments to environmental concerns (see: Partridge 1996; Steverson 
2003; Callicott 1990; Colins & Barkdull 1995; Bowles 2008; Fieser 1993). 
One such environmental sentiment involves a positive feeling towards 
natural entities or towards Nature as an interconnected whole. It is a feeling not 
just of love and admiration of natural entities, but a feeling of being in touch 
with the entities as they are in themselves without reference to any further 
human utility. This is a feeling of openness to any value, objective or subjective, 
intrinsic or inherent, anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric that a natural 
entity may have. It is a response to the organism or entity for what it can 
convey to us. It is a feeling that is captured by the fundamental sense of the 





word pathos. While today the word primarily refers to expression of pity or 
sympathy, pathetic in a root sense involves the capacity to feel what there is to 
feel from another, whether person or any other entity. While there is no 
specific word that refers to the kind of feeling, the closest word might be 
“openness.”  
This is the feeling identified by Jay McDaniel (1986) in his discussion of 
the attitudes towards natural entities in the work of the geneticist Barbara 
McClintock. In McClintock there was an “appreciative and intuitive 
apprehension of an organism” (McDaniel 1986, p. 44). This 'feeling for the 
organism' is a manifestation of the environmental virtue of openness. In this 
case it is an openness to each plant in her research fields, an openness to what 
each plant had to say.  
This openness led to a three-fold apprehension of the organism. First, 
such openness reveals any organism in Nature as unique. No two organisms are 
exactly alike and openness to them allows one to experience and appreciate 
the inherent or intrinsic worth of each creature. There are always going to be 
more things that we can learn from each individual organism if we can keep 
from sliding into the arrogant posture that says “If you've seen one redwood, 
you've seen them all.” Second, openness to natural entities can reveal 
organisms as mysterious others. Such feeling carries with it the awareness that 
there is always something wholly other to each organism. The possibility of 
each creature being only partially knowable by science stands as a direct 
contrast to the arrogant attitude that sees living beings as fully knowable. The 
otherness of each organism is recognizable only by having an openness to the 
'otherness' of each creature. Arrogance is blind to the fundamental mystery of 
the other and the uniqueness of each creature would dissolve in the attitude 
that rejects the distinctiveness of each creature. Third, openness reveals each 
creature as a fellow subject, a locus of intrinsic value, worth and respect. This 
feeling for the organism involves an openness to the goals, concerns, and 
intrinsic needs of any or all creatures over and beyond the instrumental value 
they might have for humans.  
The focus on the individual organism can be broadened to include a 
feeling for or an openness to ecosystems, natural areas or events, or to Nature 
as a whole. Such an openness reveals a basic interconnectedness between all 
natural entities. It challenges the idea of individual entities as fundamentally 
atomic, isolated, and unconnected things. The arrogant attitude of a person who 
thinks he or she is truly removed from the consequences of his or her action is 
called into question by this feeling for basic interconnectedness. To be open to 
Nature is to recognize that a person is one subject among others interwoven in 
a net of relations. At a fundamental level I am, as Ortega y Gasset pointed out, 
myself and my circumstance. While contemplating Lake Solitude in the Rocky 
Mountains Holmes Rolston, III asks: “Does not my skin resemble this lake 





interpenetration across a surface designed for passage and exchange, as well as 
for delimination and individuation” (Rolston III, p. 224). Note how, in his 
openness to the lake and its surroundings, Rolston does not lose his sense of 
self completely, recognizing that an essential feature of living is to be in 
symbiosis, to stand in reciprocal relation to other natural entities. Nature 
provides to the ‘open’ person an experience of distinction as well as 
connection. Of this feature of Nature Rolston says: 
To her teasing, her relentless stimulus, we respond in a ‘standing 
out,’ an existence, where the I is differentiated from the Not-I. The 
environment moves; we are moved, but then reaction is elevated 
into agentive action. Ecological prodding brings forth the ego. 
“The landscape thinks itself in me, and I am its consciousness” 
(Cezanne) (Rolston III, p. 225). 
Through an openness to wildness the self can discover itself in this 
intimate relation with Nature. But also in this encounter with wildness Rolston 
discovers the mysterious other mentioned earlier. In his openness to Nature he 
discovers not only a connection but an opposition that offers a chance to 
realize a needed complement to himself that can no longer be found in civilized 
life. Of this experience of existing in the natural world Rolston says that with 
this  
there is a communion, but of opposites. The medium that a 
person is in and of, he or she is also over and against. When the 
person encounters a world different from himself, he faces a 
centrifugal wildness which, if unresisted, will disintegrate his 
centripetal self, but which, if withstood, may be incorporated and 
domesticated. To travel into the wilderness is to go into what one 
is not, so that in returning to and turning from its natural 
complement, mind grasps itself. I encounter an other of which I 
have the greatest need. Thus journey here is an odyssey of the 
spirit traveling afar to come to itself (Rolston III, p. 225). 
The danger to the self is what makes the closed person, the 
environmentally arrogant person, so readily willing to destroy the natural 
world. Perceiving perhaps at an unconscious level the fundamental challenge to 
the self, the environmentally arrogant person is willing to destroy the threat to 
self rather than take to challenge to confront the mysterious other and return 
to the domesticated world with an expanded sense of self.  
And in this encounter the mysterious other is revealed not to be a mere 
object, but another subject with its own telos. An end which has its own 
intrinsic worth to be respected, whether it be a single corn seedling or an entire 
wilderness area. Through the feeling of openness to nature a person thrives in 
between the impoverished self-closed to the enriching encounters possible 
with nature and the disvalued self that refuses to place itself within Nature as a 
valued subject among others, unwilling to say “I” to the “Thou” of nature. 





3. From Environmental Sentiments to Environmental Virtues 
When this environmental sentiment has been internalized in a person to the 
degree that responding this way to natural entities has become an integral trait 
of a person’s character we can speak of openness becoming an environmental 
virtue (Aristotle 1962, v. 1098a10).  
So far I have been speaking of distinctive environmental virtues. One 
immediate challenge is to show that there are such virtues, and that EVE is not 
merely an extension of traditional virtue ethic thinking into environmental 
concerns. This objection has been raised and answered before (Frasz 2004). 
But another defence can come from looking at the way Aristotle himself 
objectively grounds virtues and by showing that his grounding is incomplete 
and, when expanded can allow for distinctive environmental virtues. 
As argued by Martha Nussbaum (1988, pp. 32-39; French, Uehling, & 
Wettstein 1988)1, Aristotle in his Ethics (1962, ch. 2.7, 3.5, 6) begins with “a 
characterization of a sphere of universal experience (what Nussbaum calls 
‘grounding experiences’) and choice, and introducing the virtue name as the 
name (as yet undefined) of whatever it is to choose appropriately in that area 
of experience.” He then will flesh out his account what the term means and 
why it is the better account than rival accounts. 
Aristotle identifies first various spheres of human experience where 
people have to make various choices. These are areas that contain experiences 
that are common to more or less any human life. They involve things that most 
people have to address in living their lives as human beings. For example, it is a 
feature of human life that we can choose how to respond to danger and threats 
to our life, we can act in different ways. Courage would refer to those 
appropriate responses and actions, while cowardice and foolhardiness refer to 
inappropriate responses and actions. Second, he asks, what is to choose and 
respond well within such a sphere? or hat is it to choose or act in poor, 
deficient, or excessive way in such a sphere? His “thin” list of virtuous terms 
reflect whatever it is to be stably disposed to act appropriately in that sphere. 
We may or may not have a good word such responses or actions. His “thick” 
account is his reasoned defence of one particular account of a virtue and why it 
is to preferred over some other account. 
What Environmental Virtue Ethics adds to this account is to describe 
the missing “environmental” grounding experiences of human life and then 
“thicken” the definitions of the virtues of the virtues by showing how particular 
new definitions provide an understanding of better ways to act or choose 
appropriately in these spheres. Different accounts of “green” virtues can be 
                                                             
1 Nussbaum points out that traditionally for various spheres of human life there are 
identified particular virtues.  In the sphere of fear of important damages, especially 
death, there is the virtue of courage, in the management of personal property, where 
others are concerned there is the need for generosity, etc.  These are objective spheres 





seen as different answers to how to live well or in an excellent way with the 
natural world. We can assess the definitions as different solutions in light of 
how well they deal with the complexities of living in harmony with natural 
world. Some EVE theorists have already extended traditional virtues into these 
environmental grounding experiences.2 What I argue for here is a distinctive 
“environmental” virtue, that of openness as a way or habit of character in 
responding to the “Other” of natural entities of all kinds. 
An environmental virtue is a perfection of one's character regarding the 
relationships between self and the natural world, a person with a good 
environmental character should be able to flourish more fully in such 
relationships and in personal development. Having environmental virtues such 
as openness and leading an environmentally good life makes flourishing in a 
biotic community more likely. I follow James Liszka when he describes a 
flourishing life as  
one that allows you to enjoy the real pleasures of life, to engage in 
highly qualitative relationships with others, to attain a certain 
amount of wealth in a respectable way, and to reach a certain 
well-deserved status and recognition, but all within the context of 
virtuous living (Liszka 1998, p. 238). 
When this openness is part of one’s disposition to respond to the 
natural work and its members, one is more likely to establish the kind of 
qualitative relationships Liszka describes. 
One way to describe the nature of this characteristic of openness is a 
negative way, by describing what it is not. i.e., by describing the extremes that 
characterize the vices associated with this virtue. On one end of the scale is the 
arrogance of overbearing self-importance. This trait closes a person off to any 
experience of value or worth in nature other than seeing it merely have an 
instrumental value for achieving personal ends. It is also a fixed perspective on 
the world, one that cannot see beyond oneself and what matters to oneself. It is 
the arrogance that one has all the answers, all the insights, and all the means 
for achieving a full human life. What disturbs us in an arrogant person is the 
'closed-ness' of his or her views, the narrow or closed-mindedness of a person 
who is incapable or unwilling to consider a different viewpoint. As intolerance 
or narrow-mindedness towards other persons is considered a vice, an 
extension of this trait towards other natural entities is an environmental vice. 
We consider a person who is emotionally closed off to Nature as spiritually 
dead, incapable of appreciation of natural things except in terms of resources 
solely for human ends. And as such a person may very well live a life of limited 
love and affection towards other people, and may see them only insofar as they 
                                                             
2 Sandler (1988) provides a list of “environmental” virtues.  Philip Cafaro (2010) lists 
patriotism as an environmental virtue, as well as arguing that gluttony is an 
environmental vice. See also Cafaro (2005). Geoffrey Frasz (2005) has described 
benevolence as an environmental virtue. 





can contribute to one's own needs. Would not a person who is closed off 
emotionally to natural entities also live a shallow life of limited love?  While 
there is no guarantee that being open to Nature will also manifest itself in 
openness to other people, it can be argued that someone who is more open to 
other people as they are in themselves, could be more likely to expand this 
sense of openness to nonhumans because there are fewer boundaries between 
the person and other beings. And as the arrogant person is less likely to 
consider the consequences of an action except as they impact on him or 
herself, the environmentally arrogant person, one who is closed off to natural 
entities as they are in themselves, is less likely to consider the environmental 
effects or consequences of actions towards nature. It is widely agreed that this 
insensitivity to environmental effects has led to the environmental crisis facing 
us today. And contributing to this crisis is the arrogance of perceiving nature 
only in instrumental terms, to be closed off to natural entities as they are in 
themselves. It is also the insensitivity to the feelings of nonhuman entities 
which manifests itself in uncaring cruelty in the way animals are used for food, 
sport, or research. The arrogant attitude is blind to this value for it can conceive 
of other creatures only as instrumental objects, not as subjects in their own 
right of a life. To be able instead to say “Thou” to another creature requires that 
I be open to the distinctiveness of that organism as subject of a life3. The 
environmental virtue of openness is necessary to be able to intuitively 
apprehend this subjectivity in others. Consequently, openness fosters respect 
for each organism as a subject with intrinsic value to it. And the honest 
recognition of subjectivity requires that one be open to subjectivity in other 
organisms and in oneself as well. Arrogance is one end of the scale and is a vice 
that has been widely noted and discussed. On the other end of the scale is a 
trait less widely discussed but still a vice nonetheless. It is the trait of an 
excessive lack of self or of worth of the individual in environmental matters. 
This trait becomes manifested in those environmental ethics that propose to 
extend moral consideration to some or all living things. Sufficient it now to 
indicate that this attitude is something that is often mentioned in discussions of 
environmental fascism.  This discussion is examined in (Callicott 2013, pp. 
225–226).  
By focusing on these extremes of environmental openness it is possible 
to delimit the range of what would be an acceptable scope to a 'proper' 
openness of natural entities. But there is also a need to specifically develop the 
features of this virtue. In a positive sense 'openness' is an environmental virtue 
that establishes an awareness of oneself as part of the natural environment, as 
one natural thing among others. A person who manifests this trait would be 
                                                             
3 It does not follow that such openness requires us not to use, consume, or even kill 
other organisms.  To be subject of a life does seem to involve a respect for that life, but 
as is the case with many hunter gatherer peoples, the prey is respected and even 





one who is neither closed off to the humbling effects of Nature, nor one who 
loses all sense of individuality when confronted with the vastness and sublimity 
of Nature. Such a person is capable of feeling a response triggered by natural 
events, who is able to let Nature speak to him or her. It is a receptiveness to 
natural entities as they are in themselves. We value openness to other people as 
an esteemed quality of character since it fosters feelings of love and 
appreciation for other persons. I believe that as this quality is developed 
between persons, when it is coupled to an understanding of human beings 
existing within Nature, that openness to Nature will be more likely to result. 
Furthermore, I hold that fostering such an openness to natural entities can 
reinforce a sense of openness to other persons4, a quality which we already 
esteem and value. To the challenge of why should people develop this virtue I 
reply that not only will it develop an attitude that values Nature for its own sake, 
but will also contribute to the development of qualities of openness to other 
people. If a critic is willing to admit to the value of openness between persons, I 
reply that that character trait can be fostered by activities that 'open up' a 
person to Nature. One such activity is the experience of wilderness solitude.  
When the experience of community with other persons is replaced by 
the experience of solitude in wilderness, then the best possibility exists for 
encounter with the natural order of things. Again, there is no guarantee that 
such an awareness will, indeed, occur. But such a condition of being alone in 
wilderness does make such an encounter more likely. The experience of 
wilderness solitude, whether by a wilderness lake, in a wild cave, or among the 
peaks of a mountain range, can open up a person to an awareness of nature of 
things, as they are for themselves, as they exist independent of human needs or 
concerns. One goes to wilderness to encounter the natural order, to discover 
one's place within this order, to be open to what Nature has to say. In this 
encounter one discovers that one is both self and circumstance, that the self is 
a semi-permeable membrane. One is neither closed off to Nature nor does one 
lose the sense of self-worth. And returning from the wilderness to the 
community of other persons, one can have the further appreciation of persons 
as other others who exist in a community of interdependence with roots in the 
natural order. But in order to fully appreciate all the members of this mixed 
biotic community, it is necessary that a person be able to first feel what Nature 
has to reveal. When responding with this environmental sentiment becomes a 
disposition of one’s character, then a person has begun to cultivate openness as 
an environmental virtue. 
                                                             
4 A critic may complain that after a sojourn into the wilderness he or she often 
experiences a hostility or antipathy towards people in the urban areas, especially those 
who do not seem to care for nature.  I reply that this anger is directed more at the 
actions of certain people and not at each and every person, human beings having some 
inherent worth that needs to recognized and honoured.  It is often easy to forget the 
admonishment to “hate the sin, but not the sinner.” 
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4. Further Work In for a Full Theory of Environmental
Character
This paper represents an approach to complete EVE by showing a connection 
with the environmental virtues that are associated with environmental 
feelings/sentiments. However, a full theory of EVE will need to develop what 
these are and how they connect to environmental traits of character making up 
the bulk of current work on EVE. Furthermore, a full theory of EVE must also 
provide an account of the nature of strength of character regarding these 
virtues. While it is good to feel a desire to care for nature and a concern that 
this desire be reflected in the behaviours that make up one’s character. Yet to 
make sure this concern is reflected in action requires an account of how 
strength of will plays a role in maintaining environmentally grounded action, 
even sacrifice. Such an account will also have to explain the phenomena of 
weakness of will when attempts are made to adopt a better, environmentally 
sensitive set of actions and modify one’s character to reflect environmental 
concerns. While autonomy is often held necessary for doing the right thing, 
how this self-legislating stance can be connected to an environmental sense of 
the interconnectedness of all things remains still undone.  But even if a theory 
of EVE provides account of sentiments, moral strength and virtuous 
dispositions that together all form a basis for an environmentally informed 
moral character, it will remain incomplete. 
To be complete an account of a good environmental character must 
provide an account of the wisdom needed to articulate and guide an 
environmentally good life. Without an account of environmentally informed 
wisdom, an environmentally good person will remain morally blind. 
Environmental wisdom is needed to give direction and inform decisions along 
the way of living an environmentally good life. Coupled with a full account of 
what kind of person EVE would have us be, there is needed an account of an 
environmentally wise person, someone who has a sophisticated understanding 
of the [natural] world and is adept at living a morally satisfying life informed by 
that understanding. What is further needed is an account of an environmentally 
informed account of wisdom and the way it infuses the character of an 
environmentally wise person (One initial attempt at providing such an account 
of “green” wisdom is found in: Frasz 2011). This addition of an environmental 
account of wisdom gives an environmental spin on a well-worn metaphor: 
environmentally grounded moral sentiments makes us desire a worthwhile 
destination, but an environmental sound vision tell us where to look.  Moral 
strength may provide us with the will power to do what is necessary to go the 
distance to attain this environmentally informed destination, but 
environmentally grounded judgment tells us when it is best to exercise strength 
of will in environmental situations. Environmental virtues keep us on the path 
and from developing environmental vices that cause us to stray from it, but an 
environmentally grounded understanding of deliberation shows us how to best 
Geoffrey Frasz 
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use the path to get to that destination. With this addition of a green 
understanding of wisdom, it will be possible to have the necessary 
environmental grounding that we would want for an environmentally good 
character. 
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Environmental Character: Environmental Feelings, Sentiments and Virtues 
Abstract: An argument is made that to further develop the field 
of environmental virtue ethics it must be connected with an account 
of environmental sentiments. Openness as both an environmental sentiment 
and virtue is presented. This sentiment is shown to be reflected in the 
work of Barbara McClintock. As a virtue it is shown to a mean between 
arrogance and the disvaluing of individuals, a disposition to be open to the 
natural world and the values found there. Further development of EVE is then 
shown to require a connection with an account of environmental wisdom. 
Keywords: environmental ethics, Barbara McClintock, virtue 
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